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Gellner’s Structural-Functional-Culturalism* 
 
CHRIS HANN** 
Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle (Saale), Germany 
Abstract: Enlightenment traditions celebrating the individual and knowledge that is 
universally valid are only one stream in the social philosophy of Ernest Gellner. As 
a philosopher, he vehemently rejected Wittgensteinian relativism. As a social an-
thropologist, he prioritised the study of ‘structure’ and ‘function’, rather than cul-
tural ‘costume’. Yet his theory of nationalism relies on a concept of culture, which I 
suggest derives ultimately from the Herderian countercurrent to enlightenment uni-
versalism. This notion of culture has a surprising affinity with the world view of 
Clifford Geertz. The paper argues that such holistic notions of ‘a culture’ are uncon-
vincing anthropologically, increasingly unrealistic sociologically, and anti-liberal 
politically. 
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Introduction 
Five years after his death, the influence of Ernest Gellner remains pervasive. It tends per-
haps to be stronger among sociologists and political scientists than among philosophers 
and social anthropologists, though these were the nominal disciplines in which he worked 
for most of his career. He is probably best known for his work on nationalism, but his 
contributions to understanding Islamic societies and socialist societies continue to fasci-
nate later scholars. In all of his work Gellner is viewed by posterity, as he was in his life-
time, as a voice of cool reason; and he himself encouraged such a view, e.g. in 
characterising his intellectual position as that of the ‘enlightenment puritan’, or the ‘ra-
tionalist fundamentalist’. When the rest of the world was drifting into relativism and 
postmodernism, he stood firm for universalism. Knowledge, notably that produced in the 
modern West, could transcend the boundaries of culture and morality. It was fatuous for 
relativists to pretend otherwise. Hence the many extended polemics, with Geertz in an-
thropology and with the successors of Wittgenstein in philosophy. 
In assessing the dichotomies that Gellner constructs to support his ‘cognitive uni-
versalism’, it is easy to overlook the fact that he, too, relies extensively on a concept of 
culture. The aim of this paper is to subject this to a closer inspection. I shall point to a 
surprising degree of overlap with the dominant Geertzian usage and suggest that, despite 
the ceaseless rejection of Wittgenstein, underpinning Gellner’s work is a concept of cul-
ture that derives ultimately not from the philosophers of the Enlightenment but from his 
own background in Central Europe. 
                                                     
*) This is a revised version of a presentation made at the ‘Gellner Seminar’ in Prague on October 
25th 2000. I am grateful to participants for helpful comments and especially to Peter Skalnik for 
his stimulus and hospitality; and to Patrick Heady, for comments on a later draft. 
**) Direct all correspondence to: Chris Hann, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, P.O. 
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Structure and culture 
Gellner’s interest in culture diverges markedly from that of most contemporary anthro-
pologists. When he discovered social anthropology at the London School of Economics 
in the 1950s, the tradition of Bronislaw Malinowski’s ‘functionalism’ had been modified 
by Radcliffe-Brown’s insistence on the search for general principles of social structure. 
Gellner found this synthesis deeply congenial and remained loyal to this ‘structural-
functionalism’ long after most of his contemporaries had moved on elsewhere. Most of 
them, in Britain as in America, went in what can loosely be termed the Geertzian direc-
tion. They paid less attention to function and structure than to the meanings understood 
by the actors they studied and the problems of interpreting what was said and what was 
symbolised in ‘other cultures’. Gellner always resisted this move. His stance retained an 
affinity with that of the early Edmund Leach, whose analysis of political systems in High-
land Burma [Leach 1954] was a search for structure rather than an effort to understand 
the cultural ‘dress’ of the social order. Much the same could be said of Gellner’s adapta-
tion of segmentary lineage models in the analysis of political systems in Highland Mo-
rocco [Gellner 1969]. But whereas the later Leach used the methods of French 
structuralism to explore the cultural phenomena he had previously disdained, Gellner was 
never attracted by these methods and polemicised vigorously against the rise of cultural 
studies: he was not interested in analysing the details of cuisine or ‘wallpaper’! Culture 
was at best of secondary importance. Of course every human group had such a ‘costume’, 
but social anthropologists were concerned with ‘the real structural and functional aspects 
of our life’ [Gellner 1992a: 95], not with inventories of folklore and similar ‘decoration’. 
From this angle, Gellner is a structural-functionalist of the old British school and 
very far from being either a structuralist or a culturalist. But his interest in long term 
transformations, notably the rise of the West and the significance of nationalism, led him 
to develop a structured model of human history that depended crucially on a concept of 
culture. He elaborated this in successive versions of his theory of nationalism, which he 
famously defined as a principle that requires the political unit (the state) that should coin-
cide with the national unit: “Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds 
that the political and the national unit should be congruent.” [Gellner 1983: 1] As he con-
cedes a few pages later, this definition is parasitic on a definition of nation, which turns 
out to be even harder to pin down than state. Both are contingent: “Having a nation is not 
an inherent attribute of humanity, but it has now come to appear as such (…) Two men 
are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn 
means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communi-
cating.” [ibid.: 6-7] Gellner then adds a subjective, voluntarist criterion and suggests that, 
because it is so hard to define culture, we should look instead at what it does. In the agrar-
ian age: “Local culture is almost invisible (…) cultures proliferate in this world, but its 
conditions do not generally encourage what might be called cultural imperialism.” [ibid.: 
12] Complex proliferations are possible but the key point is the absence of homogeneity. 
In industrial society, in contrast, “A high culture pervades the whole of society, defines it 
and needs to be sustained by the polity. That is the secret of nationalism.” [ibid.: 18] 
Gellner in fact argues for a triple correspondence (or ‘congruence’) of culture, nation and 
state, which is achieved in unique modern conditions because of the organisational re-
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quirements of an industrial society.1 In this and other books on the subject, he further 
insists [e.g. Gellner 1997: 3] that humans have always lived in cultures, long before mod-
ern ethnic groups and nations were invented, just as they have always had social organisa-
tion. His examples include the diversity of the Ottoman Empire, based on recognition of 
several religiously-defined millet. The implication is that one’s group is one’s culture, 
though he also mentions the possibility of ‘multiculturalism even in small bands’ [ibid.: 
14], as documented by Lévi-Strauss in Brazil. 
Here I am not interested in pursuing the ‘modernist’ theory of nationalism, argua-
bly the crowning jewel of Gellner’s oeuvre, but the concept of culture, which is left 
largely unelaborated and implicit. Gellner, like Malinowski, slides between a singular 
usage of culture (useful in highlighting how humans differ from other species) and the 
plural use in which cultures appear as thing-like, bounded wholes. As he put it: “…this 
capacity of ours for acquiring culture does not prejudge just which culture it is to be. Cul-
tures vary enormously from one community to another, and they can also change with 
great rapidity within a single community.” [ibid.: 2] In Chapter 15 of the same book, 
based on one of his last public debates before his death in November 1995, Gellner looks 
again at the issue of cultural continuity and suggests, in line with his modernist position, 
that most modern nations ‘have navels invented for them by their own nationalist propa-
ganda’. [ibid.: 96]2 He finally declares both temporal and spatial (dis)continuities be-
tween cultures to be open questions that warrant further research. But at whatever instant 
of time the investigator comes along, he implies that individuals can be slotted in to one, 
and only one, culture. There is no mention of variation within these ‘package-deal 
worlds’ [Gellner 1992a: 80]: everything of importance in each culture seems to be shared 
by all its members. 
To summarise the argument so far, Gellner is at heart loyal to British structural-
functionalism and pushes the search for elegant structural models to an extreme with his 
multiple homologies between group, culture, nation and state. His dependence on a no-
tion of culture leads me to call him a ‘structural culturalist’. Critics have pointed out that 
even highly homogeneous ‘nation-states’, such as modern Poland and Turkey, still con-
tain a variety of cultural minorities. True, but Gellner can defend his theory, in those 
cases, by pointing to the sharp contrast between the block-like ‘high culture’ of those 
states today and the multiple ‘low cultures’ which prevailed in the past. I am more con-
cerned to question the supposition that bounded ‘low’ (or ‘wild’) cultures determined the 
opinions and behaviour of their members in the age preceding nationalism. The notion of 
cultural ‘membership’ seems central to Gellner’s theory, before nationalism as well as 
after it, when it is rendered explicit [Gellner 1995]. 
Now, is this the legitimate abstraction of a model-builder or an untenable reifica-
tion of the concept of culture? In Gellner’s hypothetical Ruritania [Gellner 1983], cultures 
are on the scene long before the intellectuals set to work on them for the purposes of na-
tion-building. But what were these cultures? In the central Carpathian zone where I have 
done some fieldwork, the largest culture was presumably the ‘Ruthenian’, with Poles, 
                                                     
1) The theory has attracted criticism for its implicit functionalism. For a defence of Gellner on this 
point see [Mouzelis 1998]. 
2) Gellner [1997: 96] offers the Czechs as a typical example, in contrast to the case of Poland, 
which has a more genuine navel, and Estonia, which is ‘altogether navel-less’. This dichotomy 
corresponds to the Kulturnation versus Kleinvolk distinction. 
Czech Sociological Review, IX, (2/2001) 
176 
Jews and others forming significant minorities. With Poles there was intermarriage and 
much sharing of cultural traits, with Jews there was not. Within this Ruthenian population 
there was considerable variation and complexity. The ‘members’ had little sense of be-
longing to one group or culture; depending on the context they might state that their pri-
mary affiliation was to a small cluster of villages, to a larger region (‘Lemkovyna’), to an 
emerging nation (‘Ukraine’), to the vast east Slavic ‘linguistic community’, or to the en-
tire world of Byzantine Christianity. In short, the terms ‘group’ and ‘culture’ become 
fuzzy, even arbitrary, as soon as one comes to apply them. 
The Herderian tradition 
How might this notion of culture be explained in terms of Gellner’s general intellectual 
stance? His own sketches of his philosophical roots are consistent over the years, with 
Hume and Kant regularly singled out for quotation. Yet he recognises the inadequacy of 
Humean psychology and, by implication, of the British empirical tradition more gener-
ally, which was flawed by its ‘atomistic individualism’ [Gellner 1992b]. For the neces-
sary collective corrective to Cartesian rationalism he turns to Durkheim, who showed 
how socially indispensable compulsions are induced through ritual. I want to suggest that 
he might equally have found this corrective closer to his own personal roots in Central 
Europe, in the tradition of theorising that dates back to Herder. Herder’s notion of the 
organic community, passing on its accumulated traditions through time, is supplemented 
by a notion of the authentic individual, partly derived from his teacher Immanuel Kant, 
for whose philosophy the categorising capacities of the human mind were crucial.3 In a 
way, Herder’s world of ‘cultures’ is not so much an alternative to the Enlightenment 
imaginaire of equal rights-bearing citizens as a magnification of this individualism at the 
level of the collectivity. His philosophy, like that of Gellner, is compatible with the ra-
tionalism of Descartes, as it is with cognitive and interpretive approaches that approach 
culture as a given package; but it is remote from contemporary theories of culture as a 
generative process. 
I have no space here to outline the complex trajectory of the Herderian concept of 
culture before it became the foundational concept of twentieth century American anthro-
pology.4 It is conventional to view Franz Boas, educated in Germany, as the pivotal fig-
ure. Steven Reyna [2002] argues that Boas was the first to realise and document how 
culture provides the ‘software’ which determines not merely all the rich contents which 
fill Kant’s empty categories, but the culturally variable definition of those categories in 
the first place. We know that Boas read Kant and, even if no direct link to Herder has 
been established, this concept of a cultural community was transmitted by a sort of intel-
lectual osmosis. It was finally elaborated and celebrated by Boas and his students in the 
specific political conditions of the inter-war period. 
Bronislaw Malinowski did his best to make the concept of culture similarly central 
in the British tradition, but here its triumph was delayed by the structural-functionalism of 
the late colonial period. Gellner, who acknowledged Malinowski as his ‘intellectual aca-
                                                     
3) When Herder argued that each person had his or her own ‘measure’, he was in effect repeating 
on the micro level his argument about collectivities. “Jeder Mensch hat ein eigenes Maass, gleich-
sam eine eigene Stimmung aller seiner sinnlichen Gefühle zu einander.” [cited by Taylor 1992: 
30]. 
4) See Kuper [1999] for more detail on recent developments in North America. 
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demic grandfather’ [Gellner 1995: 86], himself contributed significantly to the illumina-
tion of Malinowski’s Polish-Hapbsburg roots. Again, we have no evidence that Mali-
nowski actually read Herder, and Gellner preferred to attribute his anthropological holism 
to the philosophy of Hegel [Gellner 1998: 124-125]. When Andrzej Paluch questioned 
this link, Gellner’s response was to claim that “it hardly matters: the ideas were so much 
in the air that, directly or otherwise, he could not but be familiar with them” [ibid.: 125]. 
The key idea, for Polish intellectuals in a city that was otherwise an ‘intellectual suburb 
of Vienna’, was a romantic cultural nationalism. Gellner explicitly endorsed Mali-
nowski’s view of ‘culture as unity’ and praised his “…vivid sense of the crucial national-
ist premise: that men live their lives through a culture and can hardly find fulfilment in 
any other way.” [ibid.: 131, 137] This is the ‘totalitarian’ view of culture at its sharpest 
[see Hann forthcoming]. 
The concept of culture underwent a major idealist twist in the hands of Talcott Par-
sons after the Second World War, which opened up the period in which the approaches of 
Clifford Geertz and the mature Marshall Sahlins have become dominant in the discipline. 
Gellner repeatedly condemned Geertz for his relativism and insisted that some knowl-
edge, at least, had cross-cultural validity. But he did not question the concept of culture as 
such and, while insisting on ‘cognitive universalism’, he was curiously hesitant to pro-
claim an equivalent moral universalism. I think he betrays his latent Herderianism at this 
point. A careful comparison of his notion of culture with that of Geertz will show that the 
gap between them is much smaller than it is usually thought to be. 
In his recent Available Light, Geertz [2000] seeks a balance between respect for 
difference and Charles Taylor’s ‘deep diversity’ on the one hand, and the necessary rejec-
tion of what he terms the ‘configurational’, ‘pointillist’ view of culture, i.e. culture as 
integrated totality. There is no admission that his own earlier work did much to promote 
this view, no apology for the fact that the title of his most influential work features ‘cul-
tures’ in the plural [Geertz 1973]. The tone of the recent essays is consistently relativist 
and idealist, as when he explains in Chapter 1 that when he writes ‘culture’ he means “the 
mot, not the chose – there is no chose” [Geertz 2000: 12]. In his last chapter, however, 
Geertz engages more concretely with divisive forces in contemporary world politics. He 
sets out good reasons for questioning received views on nations and nationalism and de-
velops a political theory based on highly concrete particularist pragmatism, a ‘practical 
politics of cultural conciliation’ [ibid.: 256]. Geertz’s preferences and prescriptions here, 
as well as the basic units of analysis he proposes, are quite similar to those of Ernest 
Gellner. This should not be such a great surprise since, however great the differences in 
their philosophical orientation and in their means of literary expression, both men share a 
basic conservative-liberalism, a preference for stability and a respect for the individual. 
Thus, despite their epistemological differences, Geertz and Gellner share much 
common ground in their understanding of what a culture is and what it does for its mem-
bers. Gellner’s most concise definition of culture might almost have been drafted by 
Geertz [Gellner 1983: 7; quoted above].5 Hence it is not so surprising that they have simi-
                                                     
5) In a lecture given in September 1995, only months before his death, he offered a definition with 
strong echoes of the later Leach: “By culture I mean simply the sum-total of the tools people em-
ploy to communicate. Language, of course, but also anything which signals: clothing, what one 
eats, what one does not eat, what one wears, what one does not wear, (…) The general sum-total of 
tokens employed for communicating with other people. Not a very satisfactory, not a very elegant 
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lar views about the implications of cultural diversity for politics. Geertz’s political theory 
is based on concrete particularist pragmatism, a ‘practical politics of cultural conciliation’ 
[Geertz 2000: 256]. When he urges acknowledgement of a ‘differenced world’ [ibid.: 
258], this seems to correspond pretty closely to Gellner’s plea for ‘cultural pluralism’ 
[Gellner 1997: 108]. The latter exhortation rings curious at the end of an essay which 
reiterates the theory according to which nationalist homogeneity follows from the organ-
isational requirements of modern societies. This is a tacit acknowledgement that the ho-
mogenising high cultures are not as effective as the Gellner model implies. 
Geertz, through amassing a welter of examples, argues that no general model can 
make sense of the diversity of nations, peoples, cultures and identities in the contempo-
rary world. But the outcome of all these cross-cutting ties is nonetheless some sort of 
encompassing order, now based vaguely on ‘country’ as a historicised place. He fails to 
acknowledge the force of Gellner’s arguments explaining why this country normally 
takes the form of the nation-state and why, despite deviations from the ideal-type (some 
of which Gellner would dismiss as merely ‘decorative’), it is this ‘societal culture’ that 
provides both basic frame of reference and dominant source of identity for the majority of 
citizens. To capture the diversity, Geertz comes up with another analogy. The job of the 
ethnographer is to compile file cards on all observable – or perhaps he means imaginable 
– ‘levels and dimensions of difference and integration’ and then to cross-index these vari-
ous isolated identities, since they only obtain their meanings through interaction. [Geertz 
2000: 254]. This is not incompatible with Gellner’s model, in which the nation-state con-
stitutes the basic organisational framework for modernity: Geertz simply goes rather fur-
ther than Gellner in describing some of the imperfections and complications that this idea 
encounters in the real world. 
On the point of most concern for this paper, Geertz’s latest phrasing does little to 
amend the concept of culture. At the end of the day, the culture which results from all the 
‘cross-indexing’ is still a unified conglomerate. It is not, of course, a cosy, frozen consen-
sus, but an ad hoc style or approach: ‘intersections of outlook, style or disposition, are the 
bases on which cultural complexity is ordered into at least something of an irregular, 
rickety, and indefinite whole.’ [ibid.: 254-255] But what exactly is this whole? ‘Irregular, 
rickety, and indefinite’ might be a passable description of the way a late Geertz paper 
hangs together but is this late echo of the Herderian tradition a helpful perspective for 
anthropologists who wish to engage with the contemporary world? 
Why culture matters 
Debates about the concept of culture are important politically and not only for their aca-
demic interest. This word carries an enormous load in contemporary debates in many 
countries. For a recent example, consider the text issued by Pope John Paul II, whose 
roots lie in the same Central European city as Bronislaw Malinowski, to mark the begin-
ning of the UN’s ‘International Year of Dialogue Among Civilisations’. The concept of 
civilisation is left undefined, but note that it is used in the plural [cf. Huntington 1996]. 
The German text refers throughout to ‘Dialog zwischen Kulturen’ and culture turns out to 
be the dominant concept in the English version as well. The Pope comments on ‘the com-
                                                                                                                                                 
definition. It is very much like what St. Augustine said about time, that until asked what time is, he 
knew, but when asked, he didn’t know how to reply. We know what culture is, but to offer a pre-
cise definition, which doesn’t beg any questions, is difficult.” [Gellner 1995: 85] 
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plexity and diversity of human cultures. Each of them is distinct by virtue of its specific 
historical evolution and the resulting characteristics which make it a structurally unique, 
original and organic whole (…) a person necessarily lives within a specific culture. Peo-
ple are marked by the culture whose very air they breathe…’ [John Paul II 2001: §4-5, 
emphasis in original]. In the papal analysis, cultures are ‘authentic’ if they promote hu-
man dignity. They mature, as do individuals, through dialogue with others. At the same 
time, the ‘intermingling of traditions and customs’ brought about by large-scale contem-
porary migration creates the challenge of integration, for it is important to preserve ‘a 
certain “cultural equilibrium” in each region, by reference to the culture which has preva-
lently marked its development.’ [ibid.: §14]6 This text juxtaposes celebration of differ-
ences – the ‘multicoloured mosaic’ [ibid.: §22] with reminders of the primordial ‘unity of 
the human race’ [ibid.: §7] and of ‘universal ethical values’ [ibid.: §13]. The Pope may be 
accused of some looseness and inconsistency in his use of the concept of culture, but by 
the standard of much contemporary social science and moral philosophy it is nonetheless 
an impressive statement. He speaks of dialogue, dialectic, and the mutual constitution of 
cultures. Yet, like so many anthropologists, including Gellner as I read him, he remains 
thoroughly trapped within the nationalist’s view of the world the ‘mosaic’ image, which 
projects bounded, unified cultures as entities, interacting both with their individual mem-
bers and with each other is increasingly untenable in an era of accelerating globalisation. 
Many believe the concept of culture should become even more central to policy-
making than it is already, and many look to the academic literature, including anthropol-
ogy, to support their political stance. That is why these academic debates matter. Two 
camps seem to be especially influential. One position, highly ethnocentric, is the claim 
that some populations will have to change their cultures if they want to enjoy the benefits 
of democracy and development [Huntington and Harrison 2000]. Few anthropologists 
would support this use of culture, which is suffused with an old ‘Orientalist’ bias in 
European writings about other parts of the world. The alleged deep-seated barriers to 
change and development in places like East and South Asia turned out to be less formida-
ble than imagined, once certain structural conditions were in place. Ernest Gellner is 
sometimes suspected of Eurocentric bias (e.g. in his many writings on civil society) but I 
would not place him in this camp. He would not be joining those who currently argue that 
the Orthodox religion or the ‘fatalistic Russian soul’ pose a fundamental barrier to the 
capitalist transformation of Russia. 
The second position is a liberal variant of Herderianism. This also has far-reaching 
political consequences in the modern world, for example in the form of Charles Taylor’s 
case for a ‘politics of recognition’ [Taylor 1992] or Will Kymlicka’s arguments for ‘mul-
ticultural citizenship’ [Kymlicka 1995]. Here the emphasis is on escaping from Western 
ethnocentricity, so it is hardly surprising that multiculturalism has attracted a good deal of 
support among anthropologists. Recently, however, a number of critics have questioned 
the wisdom, from the point of view of liberal objectives such as widening choices and 
increasing social mobility, of classifying persons into particular cultural communities. 
Brian Barry [2001] has published a comprehensive critical analysis which reasserts a 
                                                     
6) The text continues: “This equilibrium, even while welcoming minorities and respecting their 
basic rights, would allow the continued existence and development of a particular ‘cultural pro-
file’, by which I mean that basic heritage of language, traditions and values which are inextricably 
part of a nation’s history and its national identity.” 
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more traditional liberalism, based on the individual. From a more radical political per-
spective, Richard Rorty [2000] has argued that left wing politics should avoid prioritising 
membership of a cultural community. He concludes with a preference for Mill and 
Dewey, who understood human diversity as a diversity of self-creating individuals, rather 
than a diversity of cultures. 
In these debates, it seems to me that Gellner is closer to the Central European 
Herderian tradition than to Anglo-American liberalism. The chief problem is that none of 
the contestants offers an adequate definition of culture. Most slide about inconsistently 
between singular and plural, like Gellner himself, between usages that no anthropologist 
would call in question and the outright ‘totalitarian’, in which cultural membership de-
termines everything. Gellner does occasionally acknowledge ‘the tangled unstable over-
lapping nature of “cultures”’, implying that they cannot be treated as bounded homogene-
ous units, but he does not at any point seem willing to give up his premise of culture as a 
‘package-deal’, which ‘freezes’ ideas into ‘organic’ wholes, the antithesis of atomistic 
individualism. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that, ultimately, Geertz and Gellner have a similar concept of culture, de-
rived from the intellectual traditions and political realities of Central Europe, and that this 
is inadequate for understanding and engaging with the pressing problems of the contem-
porary world. To understand the concepts of social philosophers we have only to put to-
gether what Gellner says about the invisibility of culture in Carpathian villages, and the 
air that scholars breathe. He himself did not have to read Herder or Nietzsche to acquire 
his concept of culture, any more than Malinowski actually had to read Hegel in order to 
formulate his brand of anthropological holism. This crucial concept was simply there, so 
to speak, in the air he breathed as he grew up in Prague. Many years later he elaborated a 
powerful model to explain that nationalism develops when a previously invisible culture 
becomes an explicit object of construction and reflection. In this paper I have suggested 
that this very notion of culture is flawed. It is a product of the Herderian, nationalist view 
of the world, which as Gellner himself argued is a contingent rather than a necessary as-
pect of the human condition. 
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